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FOCUS ON

PHILBY & FRIENDS

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The story of Harold Philby currently being unfolded by London's two leading Sunday newspapers has hit with seismic force. Nothing, not the tremor when in 1955 a Labor MP fingered Philby as the "third man" who had tipped Burgess and Maclean to their imminent arrest, nor yet the jolt in 1963 when upon his defection to the USSR the government declared (having denied it eight years before) that Philby was indeed that man, had prepared the public for the full impact of Philby's treasonous involvements.

There have been three distinct shock waves: first, the disclosure that the Soviet section of British Secret Intelligence, which subsumed the entire British counterespionage effort vis-à-vis Russia, was from 1944 to 1951 in the hands of a man who was himself a Soviet agent; second, the nature of Philby's, Washington activities, which from 1949 put him in secret liaison with the CIA and FBI, and the ramifications which now emerge of the damage done by his colleague in the British Embassy, Donald Maclean; third, the extent of the cover-up by high government officials who must have known who Philby. was, certainly by 1951, when after secret hearings he resigned from the Foreign Service, if not before. Indeed the case with which Philby was able to establish himself in supreme positions of control within the Intelligence bureaucracy suggests that ample cause for embarrassment to the authorities existed to protect him when he exposed his commitment to Burgess and Maclean. For by 1951 Harold Philby had been a Communist agent for eighteen years.

How Philby managed to become part of the Secret Intelligence Service in 1941, going on in 1944 to organize its Soviet section, is a story that cuts deep into the layered tribal structure of the British civil service establishment, slicing across the school, club and professional connections which provide automatic insulation against the need for security precautions or reforms. Though Philby was indeed an "old boy," he "could have fooled anyone," according to the editor of the Observer—"it is silly to blame the 'old boy' network." Yet when Philby left the Foreign Service he not only remained on the government payroll but found a good post from which to work his way back—Middle East correspondent, courtesy of the Observer.

It was from Beirut, of course, that Philby eventually defected after, says the Times, evidence was given against him by George Blake, 1966's Spy of the Year by virtue of his farcically simple escape from Wormwood Scrubs. The report now is that British Intelligence, or what is left of it, has undertaken an investigation of the entire Ox-

bridge generation born between 1900 and 1914, on the theory that old boys never die, they just defect.

MACLEAN AND MACARTHUR

U.S. interest in the Philby affair centers on a secret report on Donald Maclean uncovered by the British press. The report, filed in 1956 by the U.S. State Department, determines for the first time the full extent of Maclean's access to secret government material in the late Forties, the most crucial portions of which involved our deals with Britain on the Korean War, the North Atlantic Pact, and the Japanese peace treaty. The report confirms what had hitherto been charged only by General MacArthur and his intelligence aide, Gen. Charles Willoughby—that the U.S. Government had ruled out in advance MacArthur's proposal to carry the Korean War into China and that Russia probably knew of this through its agent, Maclean. The facts established by the report were consistently denied in every respect by the British government.